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Usury is society's oldest continuous form of commercial regulation.
It controls a multiplicity of individual transactions, each of relatively
small significance. For example, the American Banker's Association
estimates that there are about 5,300 credit card transactions per min-
ute at $40.00 per transaction.1 The aggregate of these transactions is
of major significance to society itself in promoting economic develop-
ment and controlling the negative consequences of debt.
Consumer debt in our society has reached levels never dreamed of
in our early industrial economy 2 and interest rates have risen to
levels that would have shocked the conscience even a generation
ago.3 Those high rates have been implicated in the recession of 1980,
the deepest downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930's, and
prompted the Federal Reserve system to control the supply of money
in an effort to avoid disaster.4 Controlling money supply was the pre-
ferred choice of intervention as the Federal Reserve system deregu-
lated interest rates to let them rise and fall in response to money
supply.5
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1. The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: House of Cards (WNET/Thirteen television
broadcast, Jan. 15, 1987) [hereinafter House of Cards] (statement by Bob Carlile, senior
vice president of Trustcorp, Inc., for the American Bankers Association).
2. See infra note 54.
3. See infra note 35.
4. Bennett, Can the Fed Penetrate Economy's Interest-Rate Insulation?, Int'l Her-
ald Tribune, Oct. 6, 1987, at 11, col. 5.
5. Id.
This article examines usury as a macroeconomic tool accommodat-
ing individual appetites for consumer indebtedness and society's need
for economic development. Usury laws are not simply the means of
protecting individuals from indebtedness, or of protecting the individ-
ual consumer's interest, but they are also a "means of economic pol-
icy employed ... in fighting inflation."6 This second application of
usury, as a macroeconomic tool, and not simply a microeconomic tool,
is the most important use of usury in our post-industrial economy,
particularly as we struggle with the problems of developed econo-
mies, declining employment prospects, high consumer demand for
products and services and widespread, convenient credit opportuni-
ties. While much criticism has been directed at usury laws as an an-
ticompetitive form of consumer protection, this article argues that
even assuming anticompetitive effects exist, they are not dispositive
of the merits of usury. In addition, this paper urges reconsideration
of usury laws as a means of protecting society from the negative ef-
fects of enormous consumer indebtedness.
II. USURY AS A MACROECONOMIC TOOL
The macroeconomic purpose of usury laws can be seen in the way
in which ancient societies began imposing regulation on lenders
before written history.7 The laws of ancient societies were structured
to protect the community, as well as its individual members from the
destabilizing effects of indebtedness such as debt servitude and debt
oppression. For example, the Old Testament provisions containing
the Mosaic law on usury forbade charging any interest on loans to
6. N. REICH & H. MICKLITZ, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN THE EC COUNTRIES 153
(1980). "These rules [usury laws] do not so much serve the consumer's interests, but
are means of economic policy employed by the government, especially in fighting infla-
tion. In some respects, these rules may even be detrimental to the consumer in so far
as he will not get credit in order to effect his purchase decisions." Id.
7. The one exception was ancient Greece. Prior to the appointment of the benev-
olent dictator, Solon, and the implementation of his credit reforms, there was no limit
either on interest rates or on what might be pledged as collateral in any Greek city
states. W. SMITH, A HISTORY OF GREECE 90-91 (Boston 1855). Historical accounts re-
veal that Solon reformed Athenian credit laws in order to defuse the social and moral
crisis which had arisen in Athens because of the widespread enslavement for debt. Id.
at 91-94. By the time Solon was appointed, the enslavement of debtors and their ex-
tensive use as agricultural workers on their former lands had come to such a crisis that
rebellion by the poor was imminent and debts could no longer be enforced without
fear of violence. Id. Solon began his reformation by passing a "disburdening ordi-
nance" which made repayment easier by devaluing Greek money. I.V. DURUY, HIS-
TORY OF GREECE AND OF THE GREEK PEOPLE 531 (1890). Solon also canceled all
contracts in which the debtor had pledged his body or that of his family as collateral
and prohibited such collateral in future loans. Much like modern bankruptcy, these
measures freed the debtor but left many creditors unable to collect their obligations.
The devaluation of Greek money gave creditors some relief. Id. at 96-97. Finally, per-
haps as added creditor relief, all limits were once more removed from interest rates. S.
HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 34 (2d ed. 1977).
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tribal members but did not forbid lending for profit to outsiders.8
The macroeconomic function of usury, maximizing group welfare
by preventing destabilizing indebtedness, was much easier to apply
when outside groups could be used for purposes of capital develop-
ment and growth. While the homogenous tribal or religious commu-
nity insulated itself from the vicissitudes of debt slavery and other
forms of oppression, it maintained profitable levels of commercial
lending with other out-groups. 9 With the revival of trade and com-
merce after the plague years of the 14th century, and the increasingly
heterogenous character of communities, the tension between the
need for economic development and the desire to insulate society
from the instability of excessive debt became more difficult to accom-
modate and balance in one society. Early Christians, for example, in-
corporated Old Testament law against usury into their faith.
Christianity was more ethnically diverse than Judaism as it em-
braced new ethnic groups formerly excluded from the Hebrew tribe.
In such a pluralistic community it became more difficult to apply the
Mosaic laws against usury, especially since Christian theologians in
the Middle Ages were confronted by the acute need to develop trade
and to restore the vigor of the economy of post-plague Europe.10
Complete prohibition of lending for profit would have impeded eco-
nomic recovery in the Middle Ages. Christian theologians began to
apply a scholarly "gloss" to the Old Testament law to accommodate
the needs of trade and development while still attempting to control
lenders on moral grounds. The "scholastic"11 interpretations of
usury law allowed Christians to lend for profit to Christians and non-
Christians alike so long as the interest charged did not shock the
conscience. 12
8. The Mosaic law against usury is found in Exodus 22:25; Leviticus 25:36-37; Deu-
teronomy 23:19-20; Ezekial 18:8, 10-13, 17; and Nehemiah 5:6-13.
9. For example, Rome had different usury laws for the Italian states and for its
colonies. See S. HOMER, supra note 7, at 48-52.
10. For a time in medieval Europe, Jewish pawn shops which charged high inter-
est rates were tolerated as a necessary evil. As trade revived following the Dark Ages,
those pawn shops were unable to meet the increased demand for credit. Interest Rates
and the Law: A History of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 72-77. Christian entrepre-
neurs were needed to provide capital to fill the void. In order for these Christian busi-
nessmen to lend without sinning, theologians developed investment schemes such as
the triple contract and the sale of annuities to circumvent Christian religious restric-
tions on charging interest. Id.
11. See generally J. NOONAN, A SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957) (examin-
ing the charging of interest from the catholic viewpoint).
12. The common law of unconscionability derives from this church doctrine. In
the absence of an applicable legal standard, the common law of unconscionability for-
In American society, while we continue to have usury laws, they
have been greatly undermined by accommodating the business
world's need for capital to grow and expand. This has been com-
pounded by the view of usury as a form of microeconomic govern-
mental interference justified only by paternalism. The tension
between economic development and usury laws in American society
is evidenced by the numerous statutory and judicial exemptions in
state usury laws to accommodate businesses that depend upon con-
sumer credit for their viability.1s Indeed, most modern societies have
retained usury laws despite this tension between economic growth
and fears about the dangers of excessive personal indebtedness de-
spite the fact that debt slavery and most of the other cruel aspects of
debt oppression have been outlawed. While the relationship between
consumer debt and economic development is apparent and has been
understood since the 14th century revival of trade, it is no longer
clear whether usury has any legitimate protective application in soci-
eties without debt slavery. While it probably served to moderate the
political and social unrest caused by widespread debt oppression in
bade interest rates that shocked the conscience. As an alternative to usury it has been
suggested that a statutory version of the common law standard of unconscionability be
adopted. Under this proposal, the parties may agree to any interest rate, but courts
would be able to declare any loan transaction unconscionable where the interest rate is
excessive and the loan, taken as a whole, is harsh and unconscionable. See Comment,
An Ounce of Discretion for A Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reforn for Usury Laws, 65
YALE L.J. 105 (1955). This form of case-by-case standard setting, in lieu of the much
more transparent and objective standards of most usury ceilings, is highly expensive to
enforce.
13. A recent example of a major statutory exemption from state usury laws to ac-
commodate the economic needs of a credit-dependent industry is the, Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94
Stat. 161-63 (codified as amended in note to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1735f-7 (1980)) [hereinafter
DIDMCA]. This federal act preempted state usury ceilings on many first home mort-
gage loans permitting those rates to rise in order to give relief to home builders and
related industries. "The Committee believes that this limited modification in state
usury laws.., is needed to facilitate a national housing policy and the functioning of a
national secondary market in mortgage lending." S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1979).
An example of a judicially created exemption to benefit retailers of consumer goods
is the "time-price" fiction, an exemption particularly important to retailers of "big
ticket" consumer goods. The time-price fiction allows retailers to establish two
prices-a cash price and a time price-but holds that the difference between the two
will not be considered interest, thereby exempting these prices from usury laws. THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 93 (1972) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. Retailers selling on "time" were
thus exempted from state usury ceilings on interest. This exemption greatly facili-
tated the growth of retail "sale" credit from merchants. Id. See also Morris v. Capitol
Furniture and Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775, (D.C. 1971); Hare v. Gen. Contract
Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952). Judicial decisions have also virtu-
ally exempted credit card issuers from state usury. See infra note 20. Lenders fre-
quently criticize usury as an anticompetitive interference with their businesses. Even
if this criticism is true, it is not dispositive of government and society's interest in regu-
lating debt.
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ancient civilizations, it remains to be seen whether usury has come to
serve any important social objective in our time14 or whether it is
outmoded and unjustifiable as microeconomic paternalism.
We are in the midst of an antiregulatory trend in public adminis-
tration,' 5 and in that spirit usury has been uniformly criticized in law
review literature as anticompetitive and amounting to the unneces-
sary regulation of lenders.16 Meanwhile, courts and legislatures are
in the process of disassembling most usury regimes on a piecemeal
bases.17 Before the criticism of usury becomes overwhelming, usury
should be reconsidered to examine its purpose and relevance to mod-
ern economic lives. Although it does depress competition, anticompe-
titive effects are not dispositive of the possible merits of usury.
14. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 34-35 (1982).
15. The movement to deregulate industries in favor of "free market" forces has
resulted in the repeal of regulatory laws in many areas. See, e.g., Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (deregulating some of
the cable communications industry); Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982) (deregulating buses to facilitate competition with other pub-
lic transportation, especially cut-rate airlines); DIDMCA, supra note 13 (deregulating a
variety of federal lending institutions and exempting them from state usury laws); Mo-
tor Carriers Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (deregulating most of
the interstate freight hauling industry that had formally operated under price and en-
try controls); Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980) (der-
egulating rates in the railroad industry); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (deregulating the airline industry).
16. For articles discussing the anticompetitive effect of the regulation of lenders,
see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at ch. 6 and 7; Benfield, Money Mortgages, and
Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 819 (1968); Boyes & Roberts,
Economic Effects of Usury Laws in Arizona, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J. 35; Curran, Legislative
Controls As A Response To Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
409 (1967); Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23 Bus.
LAW. 931 (1968); High, Consumer Credit Regulation In Texas-A Rejoinder By An
Economist, 50 TEx. L. REV. 463 (1972); Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on
Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REV. 81 (1967); Jordan & Warren, A Pro-
posed Uniform Code For Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 441 (1967);
Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1968);
Kawaja, The Case Against Regulating Consumer Credit Charges, 5 AM. Bus. L.J. 319
(1967); Kipke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Credit-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM
L. REV. 445 (1968); Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Percent Simple: The Arkansas
Case, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 592; Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's
View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1972); Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs,
and Benefits, 27 STAN L. REV. 951 (1975); Comment, Interest Rate and the Law: A His-
tory of Usury, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61; Comment, Should Usury Statutes Be Used To
Solve The Installment Sales "Problem"?, 5 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 389 (1964); An
Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like That... ", 1968 U.
ILL. L.F. 544; Comment, Usury Legislation-Its Effects on the Economy and a Proposal
for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 199 (1980).
17. See supra note 13.
Usury may still be a good way for society to moderate competing in-
terests in the use of credit and the accumulation of debt in society.
Jeremy Bentham's paper on usury published in 178718 articulated
the philosophy of modern critics of usury and accounts for the ambiv-
alence of modern nations' attitudes to usury laws. While most devel-
oped nations still have usury laws,19 they are riddled with
exemptions to benefit a trade or industry.20 Bentham and the mer-
cantilists favored the rapid economic development of their society
and they discounted the potential for instability due to indebtedness
based on the theory that individuals exercise free choice and negoti-
ate their own best interests. The aggregate of individual choices was
also considered the best proxy for society's best interests. In his let-
ters on Defence [sic] of Usury, Bentham wrote:
No man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open,
ought to be hindered, with a view to his advantage, from making such a bar-
gain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit: nor (what is a necessary
consequence) anybody hindered from supplying him, upon any terms he
thinks proper to accede to.
2 1
Bentham's "free" market theory of usury has influenced the mod-
ern view of usury in ways that make it profoundly different from
that of ancient societies. Bentham's assertion implies an idealized
bargaining dialogue between borrower and lender. The lender is pre-
sumed to bargain for his or her own self interest to charge the high-
est rates the traffic will bear and to "puff" or even mislead the
buyer. This conduct is to be offset or limited by the borrower's com-
parison shopping, questioning, and negotiating. This bargaining dia-
logue will yield the "fair price," i.e., the price and amount of credit
that is in the individuals' and society's best interests. This normative
dialogue presumes equal aptitude, intelligence, information, and vigor
on the parts of both borrower and lender. To the extent that these
presumptions about borrowers and lenders and their interaction are
untrue, the unregulated market is not "free" and does not yield the
results postulated by free market theorists, including Bentham. Two
widely different philosophies of intervention developed around this
view of society. One was committed to a model of temporary legal
18. J. BENTHAM, Defense of Usury, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3-29 (J.
Bowring ed. 1962).
19. Usury laws remain on the books of all the member countries of the European
Economic Community and most Islamic states. See generally DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF THE WORLD (1987) (discussing the commercial practices of individual
countries).
20. For example, federal decisions beginning in 1975 virtually exempted the credit
card industry from state usury laws giving a major boost to the expansion of consumer
credit. The line of federal decisions allowing banks to "export" higher interest rates
from state to state, taking the highest rate allowed began with United Missouri Bank
of Kansas City v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774 (W.D. Mo. 1975) and culminated with
Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
21. J. BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 3.
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intervention in the market-intervention designed to improve the
performance of market participants or market-perfecting strategies. 22
Others believed the problems lay beyond the market, in the inherent
nature of men and women themselves, thus favoring more perma-
nent forms of intervention, such as standard setting.23
What is most remarkable about the impact of Bentham's market
model of interest rates is that it changed the focus of policy discus-
sions about usury to his view that the purpose of usury is to regulate
a myriad of microeconomic transactions involving countless individu-
als, not to regulate indebtedness in society as a whole. Viewed as
microeconomic regulation of individual lenders and borrowers, it is
difficult to calculate the benefits of usury. However, viewed as a tool
for managing the total amount of credit in society, usury may still be
an important macroeconomic tool for moderating negative conse-
quences of widespread indebtedness in modern, post-industrial soci-
ety even as it was in ancient society.
Bentham was the first modern philosopher to openly embrace the
use of credit as a tool for economic development and as such articu-
lated the economic needs of society struggling to amass capital and to
improve the quality of life. Entrepreneurs needed the economic free-
dom to accumulate capital for investment, even at great risk. Ben-
tham's declaration gave them a platform from which the economic
agenda could be openly addressed for the first time since church laws
on usury had overshadowed secular economic life following the Dark
Ages. As discussed, 24 these church usury rules appear to have been
concerned with the group more than individuals, but they had begun
22. Market perfecting strategies are those which perfect the ideal dialogue be-
tween sellers and buyers by helping buyers to negotiate more effectively or to compar-
ison shop more easily. A market perfecting solution is intervention designed to
improve the performance of market participants, not merely to set a specific standard
committed to self-perpetuation. However, market perfecting strategies focus responsi-
bility on consumers and avoid issues of commercial standards of conduct. See Beales,
Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L. &
ECON. 491, 503-05 (1981) [hereinafter Beales]. See also infra note 38. Because market
perfecting strategies are less restrictive forms of intervention, they appeal to the cur-
rent political ideology which favors deregulation of many industries. See supra note 15
and accompanying text. They also contemplate some acceptable level of consumer in-
jury since information will not reach all consumers who need it. Usury laws which set
the interest rates lenders may charge are a traditional form of regulation and price and
entry controls. Critics of usury laws maintain that the free market is the best way to
structure debtor-creditor relationships and have focused their criticism on anticompeti-
tive effects of this traditional form of regulation. See Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low
Rate Ceilings Reexamined, 56 B.U.L. REV. 451, 452 (1976).
23. See infra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
to lose their moral force and clear purpose when the economic needs
of development began to accelerate, especially as debt slavery and op-
pression began to disappear.
Bentham's philosophy gave lenders a declaration of independence.
Usury directly regulates the lender's freedom to charge whatever in-
terest rates he can get for his or her money. But legal regulations
are appropriate to limit lender freedom when society or certain indi-
viduals may be harmed. Lenders' freedom to cause harm is con-
trolled through market-perfecting strategies or through more
permanent regulation. The principle difficulty with usury regulation
today is, however, the difficulty in finding consensus about what is a
harmful level of indebtedness, and whether harmful indebtedness is
the product of different value systems (not a reason to regulate be-
havior in a democratic, pluralistic society) or the product of tempta-
tion, ignorance, or aberration.25
Bentham's critique changed the view of usury in one further way.
After Bentham, even proponents of usury tended to defend its merits
on the basis of the individual borrower's need for protection. Since
then, usury is rarely considered a tool for addressing the widespread
effects of indebtedness. Because usury laws are so hard to rationalize
on the level of most individual borrowing, its application to a larger
scale of the problem has been lost in discussion.
III. USURY AS CONSUMER PROTECTION
To the extent that usury prescribes the rate of interest lenders
may charge borrowers, usury paternalistically substitutes govern-
ment judgment for that of the parties to the transaction, displacing
the market dialogue by eliminating bargaining at least on that term.
Viewed on a larger scale, however, usury has another important mar-
ket effect: its effect on the supply of credit. Usury is a mechanism
for controlling the amount of credit in society. By controlling lender
incentive to lend by limiting profits from lending, usury laws coun-
terbalance forces increasing the supply of credit. As such, it is a
proxy for society's interest in controlling the amount of credit more
than society's interest in controlling lender profit.
A. Paternalism for the Incapacited Borrower
Beyond the larger social interest at stake, the paternalism of usury
serves a compelling interest in the case of at least one type of bor-
rower, the incapacitated borrower. Where incapacitation affects the
borrower's ability to participate in the marketplace effectively, pater-
25. Gelfand, Authority and Autonomy: The State, The Individual and The Fam-
ily, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 125, 156-57 (1978). See also Wallace, supra note 22, at 474.
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nalism remains a compelling reason for structuring lender-borrower
relationships according to an objective standard. Although paternal-
ism in legal regulation is no longer considered a compelling rationale
for regulation,26 protecting the vulnerable is the traditional consumer
protection rationale. 27 Incapacitated borrowers are susceptible to
making mistakes in bargaining transactions, for which they must
bear the consequences. Based on the belief that incapacitated bor-
rowers will make irrational decisions about credit, or will be unable
to evaluate information or will misestimate risks attendant on the
credit transaction, government substitution of judgment is a direct
appeal to public moral values, limiting the degree to which vulnera-
bility can be used against the borrower. These are moral values
which are themselves important, even apart from efficiency
concerns.
28
There are a number of different kinds of incapacity affecting bor-
rowers, especially modern borrowers. One type of phenomenon that
will cause the borrower to be unable to evaluate information is
"bounded rationality," a limitation on the ability of any human being
to process many pieces of information. Any typical credit transaction
involves many considerations along with the applicable interest
rate-things which may be related to the cost of credit. Depending
on the product or services being purchased on credit, the transaction
can become very complicated in the number of terms to be negotiated
and their interrelationship. Because of complications inherent in any
credit purchase, borrower search, shopping and bargaining strategies
tend to reflect self-imposed limitations on information, limiting con-
sumer ability to bargain on all terms using all relevant information.
Consumer researchers have identified the following consumer infor-
mation strategies that may cause consumers to depart significantly
from the normative market dialogue of Bentham:
First .... [consumers] will ... use more readily available and vivid informa-
tion ... [such as] personal selling and point of purchase information [but ig-
noring more accurate written disclosures]. Second, consumers will process
information in the form in which it is displayed [making uniformity of termi-
nology essential to facilitate accurate comparison shopping] .... Third, con-
sumers, when searching for new producers of information, will refer initially
to previous experience .... Fourth .... [consumers] are poor statisticians and
26. See generally S. BREYER, supra note 14.
27. See Federal Pre-empting State Usury Laws, 37 Bus. L. 747, 783 (1982) [herein-
after Pre-emption Laws].
28. See Ramsay, Framework for Regulation of the Consumer Marketplace, 8 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y, 353 (1985) (discussing the need for governmental intervention in the
marketplace to protect consumer economic interests).
tend to put too much weight on small [or biased] data samples .... Fifth....
[consumers] tend to ignore small probability events [like unpleasant occur-
rences]. . . . Finally . . . consumer search tends to be limited to a small
number of alternatives even though a large number are available. 2 9
Another modern phenomenon that leads to irrational decisions
about the use of credit is a compulsive disorder called credit binging
or credit abuse. This disorder is growing among well-educated, up-
wardly mobile young adults who use credit to subsidize a standard of
living to which they are accustomed or to which they aspire, but
which their current income will not support. The credit abuser uses
the pleasure of purchasing goods to overcome feelings of boredom,
anxiety, anger, fear, or loneliness. This compulsive behavior has
prompted the formation of self-help groups, and has attracted public
attention in the media.30 This disorder incapacitates more borrowers
than the traditional types of incapacity such as mental illness, senil-
ity, and occasional illiteracy.
Protection of the vulnerable is one of the oldest motivations for
consumer protection.31 Legitimate exercise of paternalistic power
recognizes that information is of no use to an illiterate or mentally
incompetent person. In order to protect these persons from the con-
sequences of their own actions, a civilized society imposes limits on
the ability of others to take advantage of such handicaps. Usury laws
which regulate the lender-borrower relationships limit the ability of
lenders to take advantage of borrowers who are handicapped in ways
that prevent borrowers from fully participating in the bargaining
phase of an extension of credit. Usury laws do this by setting objec-
tive standards of conduct for lenders.32 Many of the borrowers as-
sisted by this paternalism might also benefit from a market
perfecting strategy like consumer information,3 3 but many borrowers
who make irrational decisions will not be able to benefit from a mar-
29. Id. at 364-65.
30. See, e.g., Bennett, Now, The Age of Fast-Buck Banking, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1986, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Hudson, I Don't Need All The Credit, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1986, at
9; Shopping Addiction: Abused Substance is Money, The Times-Picayune, June 16,
1986, at 20, col. 1.
31. See infra note 34.
32. Unlike mandatory information disclosure requirements, standard setting shifts
responsibilities from buyer to seller. See Cave, Market Models and Consumer Protec-
tion, 8 J. CONSUMER POL'Y, 335, 345-48 (1985).
33. Government can provide consumers with information by mandatory disclosure
requirements like ingredient labeling or by dissemination of educational materials.
The Federal Trade Commission has invested more of its resources over the last eight
years in consumer education by publishing booklets and pamphlets which a consumer
can order, usually free, on a variety of topics from shopping through the mail to home
mortgages. These pamphlets are written in plain language and advertised in public
service announcements in the media. The most obvious flaw in this stratagem is acces-
sibility of the information to illiterate consumers or to consumers who did not learn of
its availability. There are other major flaws with this educational strategy. See Beales,
supra note 22, at 531.
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ket perfecting strategy that refocuses responsibility for mistakes in
the bargaining process on them.
Paternalism is a legitimate restraint on lender conduct in order to
protect vulnerable people; therefore, usury should not be discarded
in its entirety as inappropriately paternalistic. Before policy-makers
commit themselves to a choice that excludes limits on interest rates,
they should obtain more empirical data on the numbers of borrowers
who may be affected by an inability to negotiate credit in their own
best interests. These people are incapacitated in terms of the norma-
tive model of consumer behavior. Lender marketing and negotiating
behavior with respect to these people is the most important factor to
control in avoiding problematic debt situations with these borrowers.
Usury laws provide objective, self-executing controls on lender be-
havior. It is important to know how many people are most depen-
dent on lender behavior rather than other factors in making the
decision to accept and use credit.
Moreover, the assumption that an unregulated market is not pater-
nalistic is not a logical corollary. An unregulated market is poten-
tially as paternalistic as a regulated market.3 4 Lenders, as the more
powerful, unified, and cohesive force, will certainly substitute their
judgment for that of incapacitated borrowers who are unable to exer-
cise judgment in the bargaining process in their own best interests.
Governmental paternalism is preferable to lender domination of the
vulnerable because government judgment is more consistent with es-
tablished public policy and public moral values concerning the limits
on freedom to take advantage of vulnerable people.
Society has a clear interest in limiting exploitation as an exploita-
tive society is in danger of instability by its exploited members. Soci-
ety also has an interest in both debt and credit as they promote
economic development and affect employment, savings, and a host of
other factors connected with domestic stability. The structure of
lender-borrower relationships should protect society's interest in in-
34. An unregulated but imperfect market could be dominated by lender prefer-
ences. If lenders substitute their judgment for borrowers', the market is no less pater-
nalistic than if government substitutes its judgment for borrowers'. See Pre-emption
Laws, supra note 27, at 778-80 (statement by George Wallace). This article is a collec-
tion of comments made by members of a distinguished panel during a program by the
American Bar Association Committee on Consumer Financial Services at the 1981
ABA Annual Meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana. The comments were edited for pub-
lication by the program moderator William M. Burke. The panelists included Beth L.
Climo, Counsel to the Senate Banking Committee, Peter D. Schellie of Washington
D.C., and George J. Wallace, formerly a professor of law at Rutgers University.
debtedness and credit. The question of whether the unregulated
market is the best way to structure these relationships is of current
importance as lenders seek more freedom from regulation in an era
of increased competition and seek to market more credit 35 to a popu-
lation squeezed by diminishing employment opportunities and dimin-
ishing standards of living.36
Ancient societies with strict usury laws were not concerned with
modern concepts of individual entitlements, individual freedom or in-
dividual protection but were focusing on balancing relationships
within their tribes, groups, or towns. These societies seemed more
concerned about the destabilizing effects of widespread personal in-
debtedness such as slavery, impoverished and homeless families,
revolution and riot, as oppression threatened the poor too much.
Modern societies ignore this focus on stable relationships and miti-
gation of the negative effects of oppression probably because those
negative effects are harder to see since legal slavery has disappeared
in most modernized nations. Yet, even in modern nations, debt has
been associated with riots and civil unrest.3 7 Instead, modern socie-
ties are more concerned about the need for economic development
which usury laws seem to impede because of the limitations they im-
pose on competitive conduct.
The tension between these policy concerns, economic development
and protection from destabilization, continues in American society to-
day, mainly in terms of the debate over who should structure the re-
lationship between lenders and borrowers, the government or an
idealized "free market." Indeed, the constituency pressing for the ab-
35. The Arab oil embargo of 1968 forced interest rates higher throughout the
economy, blurring traditional market segmentation between banks, small loan compa-
.nies and credit card issuers. For the first time, these lenders all began to compete with
one another for the same customers. See Bennett, supra note 30, at 8, col. 2.
36. Redesign of full-time employment into part-time employment, growth of part-
time and part-year work, and the spread of wage freezes and wage reductions from one
industry to another foreshadow a decline in annual salaries and decline in the average
American standard of living. See generally BLUESTONE & HARRISON, THE GREAT
AMERICAN JOB MACHINE: THE PROLIFERATION OF Low WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN THE
U.S. ECONOMY (1986) (concluding that the decline in high-wage manufacturing em-
ployment and the expansion in low-wage retail trade employment may leave America
without a middle class with middle-level incomes). This forecast is particularly omi-
nous for highly leveraged borrowers who depend on steady employment and stable or
rising salaries for repayment of debt and who also use debt as a way of supplementing
their living standard and participating in the advertised, material culture.
The projected effects of usury ceilings would impact most on "marginal" borrowers
whose income level, employment tenure, duration of residency and previous credit rec-
ord are minimal qualifications. Usury limits would counteract the expansion of credit
for more marginally qualified borrowers. Canner & Fergus, The Economic Effects of
Proposed Ceilings on Credit Card Interest Rates, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 7 (1987) [herein-
after Canner].
37. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1969) (examining con-
sumer practices and their effect on low-income families).
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olition of usury laws in both state and federal legislatures is com-
posed of lenders and businesses dependent upon consumer credit for
profitability. 38 They, like Bentham, are obviously much more con-
cerned with the role consumer debt plays in economic development
and growth than with the potential for injury from widespread in-
debtedness and an oversupply of credit.
B. Society's Interest in Debt: Development and Stability
American society has had usury laws since its days as a colony of
England and the states still retain these laws, as does nearly every
other nation with whom America trades. State legislatures have his-
torically had exclusive jurisdiction over usury laws in the United
States apart from preemptive federal legislation.39 States have re-
tained sovereignty because they feel that they know what is best for
their communities in terms of growth and potential for oppression.40
Federal legislation has mainly exempted certain nationally unified
and cohesive industries from state laws restricting their trade. The
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980,41 for example, preempted state usury ceilings on most first
home mortgages to give relief to home builders and industries depen-
dent on home building. The senate report on the Act states: "The
Committee believes that this limited modification in state usury laws
will enhance the stability and viability of our Nation's financial sys-
tem and is needed to facilitate a national housing policy and the func-
tioning of a national secondary market in mortgage lending."42
While the federal legislature has invoked its preemption powers gen-
erally to weaken state usury regimes, several state legislatures have
expanded their usury regimes to reach credit card interest rates. As
bank profits on credit cards soar 43 and consumer debt load reaches its
highest point in history,44 some states like Connecticut have lowered
38. Pre-emption Laws, supra note 27, at 782 (statement by Beth Climo).
39. See supra note 13.
40. See Pre-emption Laws, supra note 27, at 795-97 (statement by George Wallace).
41. See DIDMCA, supra note 13.
42. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1979).
43. In 1986, bank profits for credit cards will be around $5 billion dollars. Luke,
High Rates Can't Be Justified, Los Angeles Group Says, Am. Banker, Jan. 9, 1987, at 6,
col. 3.
44. Consumer debt was 19% of income in 1986. Barmash, Consumer Spending
Lull Seen: Debt Burden, Buying Power Cause Concern, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1986 at D1,
col. 6. Sandra Shaber, Vice President of Chase Econometrics, stated that the debt bur-
den is "worth considering, of course, but it won't lead to a recession." Id. at D10, col. 2.
Similarly, Robert Genetski, an economist, stated that the debt, by itself, is not really
the ceiling on permissible credit card interest rates.45 The debate
over who should structure the relationships between lenders and bor-
rowers is louder than ever.
The debate is also over who best reflects society's interest in debt
and credit, the marketplace or the legislature.46 The remainder of
this article argues that society's interest in indebtedness also includes
related areas such as society's interest in savings, employment, and
the quality of life as these relate to social stability. Lenders and bor-
rowers, in our modern post-industrial economies, share a dangerous
incentive to oversupply the market with credit which is antithetical
and unresponsive to society's broader interests in stability. In addi-
tion to the relationship between economic development and credit,
society's interest also includes the relationship between diminishing
standards of living, credit, and employment prospects in a deindustri-
alizing economy. Thus, society's interest exceeds economic develop-
ment alone, but also includes the dangers of social instability in an
era of diminishing employment and an economy highly dependent on
employment to finance widespread personal debt. The greatest
significant. The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: Off Balance (WNET/Thirteen television
broadcast, Oct. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Off Balance].
45. In most places where banks are free to set their own credit card interest rates,
there are no plans to reduce the interest rates currently charged. Despite a drop in
the prime lending rate from 13% to 10.5% in less than a year, the bankers' profit mo-
tive does not permit a reduction in the credit card rates. The Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1985
at 1, col. 5. Some declines have been documented, but they remain the exception
rather than the rule. There have been a few voluntary reductions to attract new cus-
tomers and to head off pressure for lower rates from consumer groups. See N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 6 (Manufacturers Hanover Corporation drops to 17.8
% from 19.8%). See also The Wall St. J., May 22, 1986 at 1, col. 5 (Home Savings of
America in Los Angeles dropped its rate to 16% from 20.4%; Central Bank in San
Francisco dropped to 17.76% from 19.8% and the Society for Savings in Hartford,
Conn., dropped to 13.9% from 14.9%).
Additionally, regulators in a few places have strengthened or enacted credit card
usury laws that will force banks to lower the rates. The Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1985, at 1,
col. 5. As an example, a Connecticut law lowered the maximum interest rate on credit
card loans to 15% effective June 4, 1986. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 133c (West
1987). Within two months some Connecticut banks had gone even lower to 10.9% in-
terest on credit cards.
46. This debate on market versus state regulation was typified by an exchange be-
tween Martha R. Seger, Governor on the Federal Reserve Board, and Senator Christo-
pher Dodd at hearings on bills legislating a federal cap on credit card interest rates.
Ms. Seger testified to the Federal Reserve Board's belief that credit is most fairly and
efficiently allocated where there are no regulatory constraints, and if there are legal
ceilings imposed upon credit card interest rates, then state law should set them. Credit
Card Disclosure Acts: Hearings on S. 241, S. 242, S. 616, and S. 647 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Martha
R. Seger, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board). Senator Dodd questioned the con-
sistency of that approach with the decision in Marquette Nat'l Bank at Minneapolis v.
First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), which undermined state usury ceilings by
allowing federal banks to "export" interest rates. Hearings at 93. Ms. Seger did not
see any inconsistency. Id. at 93-94, 99-101.
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probability of social dislocation would be in the event of recession be-
cause the economic matrix of widespread indebtedness, an oversup-
ply of available credit and diminished employment income, would
cause many more borrowers, their families, and, indirectly, lenders to
suffer default in a recession. Further, the market behavior of lenders
and borrowers both tend to contribute to this vulnerability by over-
supplying the market with credit and increasing the dependency on
high quality employment that will not be there in the future.
IV. CREDIT AND THE THREAT OF RECESSION
Rohatyn: "[T]he most serious issues ... are not the sort of theoretical argu-
ments about budgetary deficits, but the notion that excessive borrowing kills
you in the last analysis.
I was brought up to believe that excessive borrowing was bad for you."
McNeil: "[W]hat is bad about that? ... Americans in their private lives bor-
row more money than any other people on earth."
Rohatyn: "[I]t's also not very good for Americans to do it.... We've crushed
the private sector with debt. We're buying companies with borrowed money
which forces us to break them up and reduce employment. We're doing some
things that are very, very risky, and I think we're taking risks beyond any-
thing that's rational."
McNeil: "What is the specific risk or peril that you see? . .
Rohatyn: "[What are we going to look like if] we go into a recession... ?,,47
A. Unemployment and Consumer Debt
During recession, employment diminishes and salaries tend to de-
cline, a trend that is already part of our long term economic progno-
sis. Even apart from a recession, the trend toward redesign of full
time employment into part-time work, growth of part-time and sea-
sonal work and the spread of wage freezes and wage reductions from
one industry to another, foreshadow a decline in annual salaries and
decline in the average American standard of living.48 Meanwhile, re-
cent studies report that consumers, most of whom depend upon
47. Off Balance, supra note 44 (statement by Felix Rohatyn, a senior partner in
the New York banking firm of Lazard-Fr6re). See also Credit Card Interest Rate Ceil-
ing and Disclosure: Hearings on H.R. 78, H.R. 244, H.R. 515, H.R. 1086, and H.R. 1584
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1987) (statement of Jerry
Cosentino, Treasurer, State of Illinois) ("[L]ooming on the horizon is the third Ameri-
can deficit, the Consumer Deficit that joins the already enormous Federal and Trade
deficits that individually and collectively pose an ominous threat to the American
economy").
48. See supra note 36.
steady employment and rising income levels for repayment of debt,
have undertaken the highest debt load in American history49 with
fewer savings than ever to meet emergencies, or even temporary in-
terruptions in cash flow.
Modern borrowers (and thus modern lenders) need employment
income in rising amounts to avoid default. This relationship between
employment and default was demonstrated in 1974 by David
Caplovitz's seminal econometric study, Consumers in Trouble: A
Study of Debtors in Default.50 Loss of employment was the most
prevalent reason for borrower default on their obligations to repay
credit.51 Most of the other reasons for default were also related to
income interruptions or diminution of income such as illness of the
worker or a working family member.5 2 These income interruptions
together with "voluntary overextensions" left borrowers unable to
meet payment obligations as they become due.5 3 As our consumer
debt grows, American borrowers (individually and American lenders
in the aggregate) become more dependent on continued employment.
With consumer debt approaching one trillion dollars,54 unemploy-
ment and underemployment pose the real danger to society that
large numbers of borrowers will default on credit obligations even
apart from some event which could trigger a recession.
While default does not reduce modern debtors or their families to
slavery, the event can be devastating to individuals and their families,
as well as costly to society in quantifiable and nonquantifiable ways.
49. See supra note 44.
50. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT
(1974).
51. Id. at 57.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 53. A recent econometric study of "problematic debt situations" in the
Netherlands tends to reconfirm this portion of Caplovitz's findings about reasons for
consumer default. In this Dutch econometric study, debtors with significantly lever-
aged debt to income were finally forced to take measures to cope with the conse-
quences of individual indebtedness when reduction or loss of income occurred. Dessart
& Kuylen, The Nature, Extent, Causes and Consequences of Problematic Debt Situa-
tions, 9 J. CONSUMER POL'Y, 311, 325-28 (1986) [hereinafter Dessart]. The study also
examined statistical factors leading up to this denouement which contributed to exces-
sive leveraging of individual income. Id. These results are discussed infra notes 67-68
and accompanying text. This study presents several obvious problems in terms of its
validity for American policy decisions, since the Netherlands is a much more centrally
controlled economy. Nevertheless, it represents the most recent attempt to examine
the foundations for such policy decisions in a non-anecdotal, statistically valid study.
The Caplovitz study in 1974 is the only attempt to examine causes of consumer default
in the United States and must be updated before legitimate, responsible decisions on
consumer welfare and usury can be taken.
54. Between 1950 and 1972 consumer installment debt rose from $21.5 billion to
$137.2 billion. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 5. By the end of 1981, consumer
installment debt had reached $333.4 billion. 49 Fed. Reg. 7,741 (1984) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. § 444). By the end of June, 1986, total consumer installment debt had
reached $567.4 billion. 72 Fed. Res. Bull. app. at 40 (Oct. 1986).
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Psychological injury to defaulted debtors and their families was first
explored by Professor Wallace in 1973.55 He found that both the de-
faulted debtor and his or her family suffer loss of self-esteem, finan-
cial instability, increased stress, and dislocation of family life as a
result of default on credit.56 The psychological leverage applied in
debt collection can cause personal guilt, social censure, marital stress,
worry about possible job loss, lost productivity at work, and painful
family reorientations due to diminished income.57 The impact of
problematic debt on individuals and their families was studied more
recently by a team of researchers in the Netherlands. Their survey
of Dutch nationals revealed that the consequences of problematic
debt include social isolation, psychological stress, depression, sleep-
lessness, aggression, tension in personal relationships and other psy-
chosomatic complaints.58
Moreover, modern borrowers who lose their jobs, homes, or see
their family life deteriorate under the pressure of default may be-
come the homeless, rootless, and transient unemployed, and some-
times even the mentally ill and unemployable in American society.
Recent surveys show that many of America's homeless were once
American workers, taxpayers, and homeowners.59
Quantifiable costs of default to society as a whole include not only
these costs of wasted human lives, but also the costs of collection ef-
forts before default occurs (paid by all borrowers to some extent),
and costs of maintaining bankruptcy courts after default occurs, un-
55. See Wallace, supra note 22, at 473; Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Re-
form, 82 YALE L.J. 461, 471-72 (1973).
56. Wallace, supra note 22, at 473.
57. Id. For an anecdotal account of family life with a high risk borrower, see the
recent biographical and autobiographical sketches of spy novelist, John Le Carre in
the N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1986, (Magazine), at 40 and J. LE CARRE, A PERFECT SPY
(1986).
58. The consequences [of problematic debt] ... must also be seen in dynamic
perspective.... Borrowers also become more and more "socially" isolated, on
the one hand because of a reluctance to talk about their own situation for rea-
sons of pride and embarrassment, and on the other hand because the financial
needs which a social life involves can no longer be satisfied. It is obvious that
this will often be accompanied by increasing psychological stress. In this re-
spect, the whole range of depressive symptoms (sleeplessness, anxiety, aggres-
sion, etc. is encountered. If this type of phenomenon occurs, the sufferer
becomes less and less able to cope with the still deteriorating financial situa-
tion. At the final stage, serious tensions occur in personal relationships as
well as all kinds of complaints of a psychosomatic nature.
Dessart, supra note 53, at 328.
59. See Collin, Homelessness: A Post-Industrial Society Faces a Legislative Di-
lemma, 20 AKRON L. REV. 409, 413 (1987). See also M. HOPE & J. YOUNG, FACES OF
HOMELESSNESS (1986).
derwritten by tax dollars. Lesser quantifiable social costs would in-
clude the diminished productivity of workers in the workplace when
they are in debt trouble 60 and the long term effect on our country of
becoming a nation of debtors, many of whom are perpetually
overleveraged by debt. Finally, the pressure of dramatic increases in
consumer defaults upon bank portfolios and profitability cannot be
blithely ignored. It is impossible to quantify the effect of such a
stressful condition on public moral values such as honesty, thrift,
self-reliance, and institutions like the family. Because these costs are
not quantifiable, they do not translate readily into a cost benefit anal-
ysis61 and are easily ignored. 62 These costs do exist, however, and
ought to concern our society as much as they concerned ancient
civilizations.
60. No empirical study has been done linking debt collection pressure to worker
productivity but employers are sensitive to this relationship. If an employer learns of
an employee's debt problems, the employee may lose promotions, pay raises, and even
his or her job. Many employers lose their faith in a defaulting employee's motivation,
productivity, sense of responsibility, honesty, and trustworthiness. See 49 Fed. Reg.
7,758 (1984). Because of this suspicion, courts have found that an employer has a legiti-
mate interest in knowing about an employee's debt problems. See Voneye v. Turner,
240 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951). But cf. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 39.11, § 10 (Smith-Hurd 1986)
(statutes which prohibit discharge of an employee whose wages are being garnished).
61. The main attraction of cost benefit analysis is that it appears to offer a rela-
tively value-free approach and quantitative answers to policy questions. When input is
not quantifiable, it may be excluded from consideration, making conclusions suspect.
Another shortcoming of cost benefit analysis occurs when equity concerns override the
economic calculus. An example from the consumer protection area is regulation
designed to protect the vulnerable. See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administra-
tive Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Ramsay, supra note 28, at 357-58.
62. Banks, credit unions, small loan companies, retailers, and other industries are
much better organized and their impact on policy making is much greater than that of
consumers and borrowers. Borrower concerns are diffused across many different prod-
ucts and service markets. Trebilcock, Winners and Losers in the Modern Regulatory
System: Must the Consumer Always Lose?, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 619, 620-22 (1975).
Reliance on traditional cost benefit analysis tends to weight the interests of the lend-
ing constituency more heavily because of their articulate and organized representation.
See Ramsay, supra note 28, at 357-58. See also Diver, supra note 61, at 99, 101.
The receipt of accurate signals about the social costs and benefits is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, condition for optimal precision of rules.
One cannot, however, logically equate the intensity of the response to a pol-
icy decision with the magnitude of the costs and benefits generated by the de-
cision. The costs of sending signals of equivalent intensity may not be the
same for each of the interests affected. The most vociferous lobby need not
have the highest stake in the outcome; it may simply have the lowest organi-
zation costs.
Id.
The major risk of this underrepresentation of borrower interests is that usury is
viewed in light of its competitive focus. Legislators have lost some perspective in their
pursuit of competition and ignored circumstances where regulation of competition
might be to the long term advantage of society and consumers. See Reich, Toward a
New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1979).
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B. The Crisis of Credit
Today, institutional pressures to increase consumer debt outweigh
borrower incentive to refrain from indebtedness. Lenders, pushed by
new competition from any business that has enough market power to
raise and lend money, are under enormous pressure to sell credit and
expand their portion of consumer debt in order to maintain profits.6 3
Market segmentation between lenders had protected profitability for
many years.6 4 Banks were the most selective lenders charging lower
rates to their customers than small loan companies which served dif-
ferent borrowers at higher rates permitted by law. Deregulation and
new competition have fostered an intense competition between these
lenders resulting in more credit being made available to more bor-
rowers than ever before. This increased competition has caused an
expansion of the pool of available consumer credit and may be the
single most influential factor leading to problematic debt in our soci-
ety today. Under deregulation, banks marketing credit have ex-
tended more credit in the form of credit cards to consumers than
ever before.65 Lenders granting credit to borrowers in record
numbers and at record rates may have overwhelmed rational,
information-seeking behavior of borrowers.66 Borrowers often fail to
consider important credit characteristics such as term and rates, as-
suming that if they can obtain credit in the judgment of the lender,
they must be able to afford the repayments. This abdication in the
normative borrower dialogue makes the granting of credit by lenders
the single most important contributing factor to problematic debt.67
63. Under prodding from Senator Shelby, Ms. Seger, Governor on the Federal Re-
serve Board, admitted that the most profitable part of banking operations for many, if
not most, banks today is the credit card operation. Hearings, supra note 46, at 98.
When market rates of interest dropped in 1984 and 1985, profits on credit cards went
up. Id. at 94 (statement by Ms. Seger).
64. See supra note 35.
65. See Hearings, supra note 46, at 127-38 (testimony of James B. Wiesler, Senior
Vice Chairman, Bank of America, representing Visa).
66. See supra note 54.
67. This hypothesis was tested in the survey of Dutch nationals. Dessart, supra
note 53. The empirical data for their country proved that:
[T]he most important explanatory factor for the origin of a problematic debt
situation is institutional, namely the granting of credit to borrowers who al-
ready have one or more outstanding credits, either in the form of a second or
third credit or in the form of a transfer of credit [e.g., a consolidation
loan] .... [S]ome restraint in the granting of additional credit to borrowers
who have already taken out one or more credits is to be recommended.
Id. at 331. The average American family currently possesses 9.6 credit cards. House of
Cards, supra note 1 (statement by Bob Carlile).
Restraint on lender extensions of credit becomes very important to
controlling the amount of credit available and used by borrowers in
this climate. However, there is little market incentive for lenders in
our era of deregulation to reduce extensions of credit-particularly
credit card credit. Moreover, solutions to rising debt and its problems
should not necessarily be predicated on the rational, information-
seeking model of consumer behavior in this climate. 68
These influences are magnified by market imperfections discussed
below, such as inadequate information, lack of choices, and conven-
ience, which add to the oversupply of consumer credit and overlever-
aging of consumers in the market as consumers borrow more than
they want to borrow and use more credit than they need to use. De-
cision-making by lending institutions illustrates how lenders can ex-
ploit an imperfect market, not perfect it, when market imperfections
are based on consumers who do not, or cannot, fully participate in
the market dialogue.
Usury laws are a self-executing way of controlling the overall sup-
ply of credit. The remainder of this article explores forces contribut-
ing to oversupply of credit and reconsiders usury as a tool limiting
the aggregate amount of consumer credit in society-an important
tool in protecting modern society from the effects of deindustrializa-
tion moderating economic growth in favor of social stability.
V. AN OVERABUNDANCE OF CREDIT: MARKET FAILURES
AND OVERSUPPLY
Usury laws benefit four groups of consumer borrowers, 69 each of
whom does not, or cannot, participate fully in the marketplace.
Their failure to participate in the market causes a market failure
which, in each case discussed below, causes them to borrow more
credit than they want or need. This superabundance of credit con-
68. Once again, the findings of the Dutch survey are relevant and troublesome for
our information based strategy of handling consumer credit problems. The Dutch sur-
vey found that the relationship between knowledge of institutions extending credit
and the terms and forms of credit did not bear a simple relationship to the likelihood
of problematic indebtedness. Instead, they found a curvilinear relationship between
these two facts, i.e., "[b]orrowers with a very high or very low level of knowledge of
credit affairs have a low probability of experiencing financial problems .... Most
problems occur among borrowers with a moderate knowledge. They overestimate
their knowledge [and], therefore do not ask for more information and as a result make
the wrong decisions." Dessart, supra note 53, at 332 (emphasis added). Those with
very little actual knowledge who recognize this are cautious because they recognize
their limits, like borrowers who are very knowledgeable. Id. at 323. Ironically, bor-
rowers with the greatest chance of improvident borrowing will also be the most diffi-
cult to reach with information based solutions since "they overestimate their
knowledge and will therefore less readily appreciate the usefulness of obtaining infor-
mation." Id. at 332.
69. See Wallace, supra note 22, at 475.
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tributes to a staggering internal consumer debt. Usury affects lender
behavior by diminishing the amount of credit available.
Usury laws benefit uninformed borrowers who borrow more credit
than they want because they do not fully understand the risks.70
Usury laws also benefit the incapacitated borrowers who borrow
more credit than they want because they do not understand the risks.
Usury laws also benefit high risk borrowers who borrow more than
they may want or need because they have no choices. Finally, usury
laws benefit credit card borrowers who borrow more credit than they
want or need because they choose convenience instead of the process
of bargaining and shopping for each extension of credit. Usury laws
do not benefit the cash-paying consumer71 or the low risk borrower
who has alternative sources of low rate credit and access to adequate
information.
70. There is no general agreement on what information is useful to consumers in a
credit transaction or even whether consumers can effectively process all the data rele-
vant to a credit decision. Ramsay, supra note 28, at 364-65. Empirical studies confirm
that consumers do not always shop for the price of credit, particularly when credit is
primarily a matter of convenience not necessity. They may instead shop for low
monthly payments or some other credit term. Pre-emption Laws, supra note 27, at
779-80 (statement by George Wallace). Regulation to remedy inadequate information
may seek to improve the market's own provision of information that may be too ex-
pensive for borrowers to produce initially. See S. BREYER, supra note 14, at 27; Ram-
say, supra note 28, at 359. Information regulation may also expand the consumer's
ability to process complex information. This is the consumer education function of
providing additional information to consumers. See S. BREYER, supra note 14, at 28;
Ramsey, supra note 28, at 359. See also supra note 33. Even though the imperfect in-
formation rationale has been another fundamental rationale for consumer protection
(in addition to paternalism) it is not clear that information remedies can successfully
assist the consumer to evaluate all important characteristics of products or services.
Pre-emption Laws, supra note 27, 779-80 (statement by George Wallace). Thus, regula-
tion to remedy inadequate information is most effective to improve the market's own
provision of information that may be too expensive for borrowers to produce initially.
See S. BREYER, supra note 14, at 27; Ramsay, supra note 28, at 359.
71. Indirectly, however, cash paying customers may subsidize credit customers and
thus be negatively impacted by low usury ceilings, especially if usury ceilings are set
near or below prevailing market rates. Subsidization can occur when merchants of
goods or services sold on credit (sale credit) raise the price of those goods or services to
compensate for costs of extending credit to some but not all of their customers. By
making the charge for credit part of business overhead costs, cash paying customers
subsidize part of the cost of extending credit. Theoretically, the interest charged to
borrowers is meant to compensate the lender for the cost of extending credit. When
the lender is also the seller of goods, the lender/seller can use profits from the sale of
the goods to recoup the additional cost of credit. While this kind of subsidization is
very hard to detect and is not illegal, it contributes to the supply of credit to more
marginal borrowers and oversupply of credit in our economy.
A. Information and Market Failure
An informational failure may cause borrowers to misestimate the
true cost of credit. This can occur when the market does not produce
all the information borrowers would willingly pay for, as distin-
guished from the incapacity to use information discussed below. The
provision of additional information will help these borrowers to cor-
rectly appraise the true cost of credit, thus helping these borrowers
to bargain more effectively. Information-based remedies, including
government provision of information, aim at improving the bargain-
ing process as a market-perfecting strategy. Market-perfecting strat-
egies, however, place ultimate responsibility once more on the
borrower for mistakes in the bargaining process,72 instead of impos-
ing standards of conduct on lenders in the way that tort law usually
does. Moreover, information remedies tend to favor borrowers with
more education. When borrowers do not use information, it clearly
cannot serve a beneficial purpose. Although the relationship be-
tween information and market behavior should be a simple one,73 re-
search into consumer behavior must caution against assumptions that
consumers actually use information in a normative, rational way. In-
formation assists those who can use it because they are educated
enough to understand it and those who appreciate their lack of
knowledge and their need for information. People with moderate to
high levels of education who fail to correctly identify their own lack
of knowledge will not use information effectively,74 a problem which
affected nearly forty-two percent of the borrowers with debt
problems in one study.75 Clearly, this kind of data must affect our
disclosure-oriented solutions to consumer debt, and this type of study
should be repeated in this country to determine its validity in our
economy. Nevertheless, restraints that are necessary to trim danger-
ous credit consumption in our society may not be assumed to derive
sufficiently from information directed at borrowers if a significant
number of borrowers do not recognize their need for information and
therefore do not use it.
Usury laws, by contrast, set a standard which is presumed to re-
flect the true cost of credit, eliminating the need for bargaining.
Usury laws impose responsibility for the bargaining stage on lenders
who must comply with the legal standard instead of relying on con-
sumer bargaining to correct the market exchange between lender
72. See Beales, supra note 22, at 503.
73. See generally Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Im-
perfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979)
(stating that market models which explain market behavior are of little use to law-
yers, judges, and legislators because of their mathematical complexity).
74. Dessart, supra note 53, at 332.
75. Id.
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and borrower. In the absence of objective legal standards, unin-
formed borrowers tend to borrow more credit than they would want
if they understood its true cost. By setting an objective standard,
usury laws bring the amount of credit borrowed closer to true con-
sumer preferences by reducing lender incentives to supply credit and
thereby reducing overall supply.
Incapacitation may also cause the borrower to misestimate risks in
the credit bargaining process. Providing information will not help
borrowers who are unable to participate in the bargaining process be-
cause these borrowers cannot be empowered to bargain more effec-
tively. Market-perfecting strategies which refocus responsibility for
mistakes in bargaining on these borrowers will not remedy the mar-
ket failure caused by incapacitation of these borrowers.
B. Usury Laws as a Substitute for Adequate Information
Standard-setting focused on lenders is the only way to protect
these borrowers from the consequences of their own vulnerability in
the bargaining process. Usury laws are one type of standard-setting
rule society can impose for the protection of its members. Because
usury laws employ an objective measurement, unlike other tortious
standards of conduct, the transaction costs76 of policing the market
are relatively lower and fall on society as a whole, rather than the
class of incapacitated borrowers who are least able to absorb such
costs. Less intrusive methods of policing the market for abuses are
the tort doctrines of unconscionability77 and the statutory tort of con-
sumer unfairness,78 but these standards rely on judicial intervention
76. Transaction costs are costs of bargaining, including search and information
costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs. These costs
do not show on a balance sheet and may be ignored by traditional cost benefit analysis
(see supra note 61) but nonetheless affect the way goods and services are allocated and
delivered. See Ramsay, supra note 28, at 355; see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 30 (2nd ed. 1977) (transaction costs are the cost of effecting a transfer of
rights). Transaction costs can perpetuate externalities in several ways including im-
posing expenses on communication with affected people, some of whom may systemat-
ically underestimate the true value of relief from the problem caused by their
underrepresentation. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON.
1 (1960).
77. See supra note 12.
78. Consumer unfairness is a modern concept first codified in the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914 [hereinafter FTC Act]. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1982) (original ver-
sion at ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)). The FTC Act specifically forbade unfair and
deceptive acts and practices, leaving the Commission definitional jurisdiction of both
terms, "unfairness" and "deception." Id. § 45, 38 Stat. at 719. While deception had a
common law derivation, unfairness had none. In 1980, the Commission issued a letter
for definition and, as such, are expensive for the injured plaintiff to
enforce. This transaction cost makes less objective standards ineffec-
tive in policing high volume transactions, each of relatively small in-
dividual significance.
Absent objective legal standards, incapacitated borrowers also bor-
row more credit than they want or need because in the absence of a
meaningful expression of the consumer preference, merchant and
lender preferences dictate the amount and price of credit to the inca-
pacitated borrower. Theoretically, usury standards set at a normative
rate bring the available supply of credit to a level closer to true con-
sumer preferences by reducing supplies and lender incentives to pro-
vide credit. While reducing the supply of credit may deprive some
incapacitated persons of credit, part of the borrowing by the incapaci-
tated is prompted only by temptation, ignorance, or aberration (not
just differing values). Usury standards limit lending which also has
potential for taking advantage of this vulnerability, a paternalistic
goal, perhaps, but a legitimate use of paternalism.79
High risk borrowers also fail to participate in the bargaining pro-
cess for credit for a different reason: The lack of alternative sources
of low cost credit. They also tend to borrow more credit than they
want or need because of this failure. High risk borrowers are those
who have a high probability of defaulting on a loan or credit sale,
generally because of their marginal ability to repay credit (and not
usually because of unwillingness to pay).8 0 High risk borrowers char-
acteristically have high debt loads, virtually no savings, and they may
also have marginal, seasonal, or unstable employment. Because they
are high risk, these borrowers are unlikely to have alternative
sources willing to extend them credit at a lower cost. Therefore,
their ability to bargain and comparison shop is severely limited. The
normative bargaining dialogue presumes the availability of alterna-
tive sources of credit.
Information may be useful to these borrowers if it informs them of
the presence and location of alternative sources of lower cost credit.
This kind of information may help these borrowers participate in the
bargaining process more fully and effectively if the market has alter-
natives for them. If the market does not have alternative sources,
however, information is relatively unimportant to them. Again, in-
to the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, explaining the meaning of consumer unfairness. They listed three ele-
ments of consumer unfairness: (1) consumer injury; (2) violation of an established
public policy; and (3) unethical or unscrupulous conduct. Despite the unwieldiness of
this term, many states have followed the FTC Act and included consumer unfairness
in their state consumer protection laws. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 50,421 (CCH).
79. See supra note 25.
80. See supra note 68.
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formation strategy favors the educated borrower and disfavors the
less mobile or educated borrower, like the elderly and the poor.
Usury laws may tend to further limit sources of credit to these bor-
rowers by diminishing supplies of credit.s1 The equity question about
usury laws and high risk borrowers is whether this deprivation, in
the long term, benefits high risk borrowers by reducing their rates of
default and the attendant personal and familial strains, or whether
high risk borrowers are more injured by usury by virtue of being de-
prived of the opportunity to share in the consumption opportunities
of the more affluent.8 2
Statutory and judicially created exemptions have mitigated depri-
vation of high risk borrowers by permitting higher rates of interest
on loans to these borrowers. The failure of usury laws to control the
portion of high risk borrowing which may be prompted by tempta-
tion, ignorance or aberration, reflects social ambivalence about the
rights of persons with differing values to incur debt, even dangerous
levels of debt. Particularly in the case of the high risk borrowing,
usury laws do not reflect a clear social consensus about whether per-
sonal indebtedness is harmful or whether those with differing values
have the right to engage in dangerous conduct. Indeed, usury laws,
when applied to this market failure, reflect the "divergence of social
and private preferences"8 3 about the dangers of personal indebted-
ness. In a market dominated by lender preferences because of the
borrower's failure to participate in bargaining, once again the ten-
dency will be to borrow more credit or to pay more for it than the
borrower actually wants or needs. This tendency to oversupply
credit contributes to the danger to society discussed above. To that
extent, borrowing by high risk borrowers can be socially harmful.
Individually, however, it is very difficult to articulate any reason for
depriving these borrowers of credit beyond a paternalistic appeal to
moral values of thrift, family, life, etc., which are not clearly under-
mined by the activities of individual high risk borrowers.
81. A recent study of the effects of ceilings on interest rates conducted for the
Federal Reserve Board forecasts that lower income families, families headed by
younger people, recent entrants into the job market, people with low levels of educa-
tion and skills, and other marginal and new credit applicants would be most affected
by more stringent standards and enforcement if lenders were not allowed to charge
higher rates of interest. Canner, supra note 36, at 7. However, this study also notes
that 32% of all families would benefit initially from a federally mandated reduction in
interest rates. Id. at 12.
82. See Wallace, supra note 22, at 479.
83. See Diver, supra note 61, at 66.
Finally, credit has become much easier and more convenient to
borrow by using a credit card rather than the application and ap-
proval procedure for each extension of credit. Credit card borrowing
called "revolving" or open-end credit84 is the most convenient form
of borrowing for consumers. It is certainly more convenient than
"sale credit" extended by merchants of goods or "loan credit" ex-
tended by traditional lending institutions because credit card borrow-
ing does not require a new application for each transaction, nor does
it assess interest charges on the full amount of credit made available.
Interest is charged only on the amount of credit actually used, even
though a larger amount is available to the borrower on demand.
The convenience of credit card borrowing can cause a market fail-
ure. As borrowers discover the convenience of credit cards, many of
which are offered "pre-approved" through the mail, borrower behav-
ior changes from the normative dialogue with the lender. Credit card
borrowers rarely shop for competitive interest rates, and it should
not be assumed that this behavior may be modified by the provision
of more information.8 5 This failure to comparison shop and trade
across lender market segmentation has contributed to persistently
high credit card interest rates. The consumer's failure to fully par-
ticipate in the market results in domination of the credit card mar-
ketplace by credit card issuer preferences. Those preferences are to
keep rates and profits from these rates high. While credit card bor-
rowers have not effectively organized to counterweight this institu-
tional imperative, public opinion mobilized by media reports of credit
card profits at a time of declining interest rates, has forced some
credit card issuers to voluntarily lower their rates8 6 which have virtu-
ally become exempt from state usury ceilings through a series of fed-
eral decisions.8 7
Usury laws could have a significant effect on credit card borrowers
by forcing interest rates on this type of credit into some sort of rela-
tionship with prevailing market interest rates. Usury laws may de-
prive some credit card borrowers of credit but as lender incentives
diminish, so will supply. Again, we are faced with a policy dilemma
84. "Open-end credit" is defined under the Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(20) (1987) as "credit extended by a creditor under a plan in which: (i)
The creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions; (ii) The creditor may im-
pose a finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and (iii)
The amount of credit that may be extended to the consumer during the term of the
plan (up to any limit set by the creditor) is generally made available to the extent that
any outstanding balance is repaid." See also Singer Co. v. Gardner, 65 N.J. 403, 323 A.
2d 457 (1974) (holding that a revolving charge account was "open-ended credit").
85. See supra note 68 for a discussion of information on consumers with moderate
knowledge and low knowledge of credit institutions and terms.
86. See supra note 45.
87. See supra note 20.
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because usury laws as applied to credit card borrowing do not reflect
any clear consensus about whether this indebtedness is harmful or
whether those with differing values have the right to engage in as
much credit card borrowing as they wish on whatever terms they can
negotiate. Although the credit card borrowers' own failure to fully
participate in the market may result in their borrowing more credit
than they want or need, it is difficult to articulate any reason for de-
priving these individual borrowers of credit beyond a direct appeal to
moral values which are not clearly threatened by this borrowing.
C. Society's Interest in Controlling The Credit Supply
Society's interest lies not necessarily in control of any of these indi-
vidual consumer transactions, but rather in controlling the aggregate
of them. Society's interest is complicated by the fact that debt is nec-
essary for economic growth, but irresponsible growth can lead to so-
cial factors which undermine long term stability. Usury laws are a
useful and reasonable tool for limiting consumer debt in society's
best interest by balancing the need for economic development with
the risk of destabilizing effects on society. Uniform and effective
usury laws could be an important counterweight to the forces of
oversupply. Deregulation88 and competition8 9 only contribute to the
dangers to society from irresponsible growth. Indeed, the legal criti-
cism of usury as anticompetitive 90 ignores the broad trends of our
present economic condition which have caused the consumer debt to
balloon in the last forty years.9 1 Anticompetitiveness alone does not
mean that usury is mismatched 92 to its protective task. While econo-
mists discount the relationship of consumer debt to recession by not-
ing that consumer debt will not lead to recession, 93 there is little
doubt that in a recession all consumers suffer, overleveraged con-
sumers suffer most, and the more overleveraged our population is,
the more our society will suffer. The forces which contribute to the
88. See supra note 15.
89. See supra note 35.
90. See supra note 16.
91. See supra note 54.
92. Mismatches between regulatory problems and regulatory solutions occur, ac-
cording to Professor Breyer, where the regulatory process is particularly likely to
cause significant anticompetitive harm, where the rationale for regulation is not com-
pelling, or where less restrictive intervention can obtain the same regulatory objec-
tives. See S. BREYER, supra note 14, at 195.
93. See supra note 44.
oversupply and overleveraging of consumers in our economy make
our population as a whole more vulnerable to hardship.
Usury is a recognized tool of national economic policy, not simply
the domain of state police power. Modern European nations rely on
usury laws94 as a tool of national policy, not intended merely for the
protection of individual consumers.95 As a value moderating the sup-
ply of consumer credit in society, national usury laws can moderate
the competing interests in indebtedness and offer consumers and so-
ciety protection in a time of diminished employment or recession
which is the major problem of post-industrial development.
VI. CONCLUSION
Data on efficiency of markets should not end the discussion of ap-
propriate legal response to problems. The econometric data about ef-
ficiency in credit transactions is only the beginning of complex legal
analysis which must also consider long-term social policy issues about
what are long term ramifications of massive consumer debt in our
post-industrial society. Before deciding to jettison this ancient form
of social and economic control on modern theories of efficiency, we
must also consider in our public policy, the public moral values at
stake, including the intangible costs of family and individual suffer-
ing in problematic debt situations and the overall social impact of re-
cession in a deeply indebted society. While these consequences are
more difficult to measure than other efficiency costs, responsible
public policy demands that they be considered.
Qualitative and statistical data on problematic debt can, and
should, be updated for the United States economy, perhaps repli-
cating the Dutch survey previously discussed.96 Economic forecasting
should include efforts to forecast the effect of deep levels of con-
sumer debt on an economy in recession. Lender influence on con-
sumer borrowing behavior and consumer behavior in response to
information must be better researched before responsible policy deci-
sions can be made between disclosure-based remedies or other forms
of objective restraints on lender behavior. For example, if the results
of the Dutch survey on information and consumer response are accu-
rate for American borrowers, policymakers should seriously recon-
sider the effects of mandatory disclosures of interest rates and other
terms under the Truth in Lending Act and pending its revisions.9 7
Efficiency data is only part of the policy answer to the dilemma of
how to accommodate consumer debt and economic growth today.
94. See supra note 19.
95. See supra note 6.
96. See supra note 53.
97. See supra notes 46, 47, and 84.
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Usury is an old rule representing a choice of controlling debt which
may have meaning today. To evaluate the rule in light of efficiency
concerns we need to consider at least two other sources of data: (1)
sociological, consumer behavior research into the causes and conse-
quences of problem debt among consumer borrowers; and (2) eco-
nomic forecasting on the effects of recession on a deeply indebted
consumer population. Lenders are urging policymakers to make
judgments on a very narrow set of facts which reflect short-term effi-
ciency concerns. Such shortsightedness may cause immeasurable in-
jury if adopted blindly in our modern economy.

